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Abstract. Risk is a concept used to describe future poten-
tial outcomes of certain actions or events. Within the project
“CEDIM – Risk Map Germany – Man-made Hazards” it is
intended to develop methods for assessing and mapping the
risk due to different human-induced hazards. This is a task
that has not been successfully performed for Germany so far.
Concepts of catastrophe modelling are employed including
the spatial modelling of hazard, the compilation of different
kinds of exposed elements, the estimation of their vulnera-
bility and the direct loss potential in terms of human life and
health.
The paper is divided in two sections: First, an ana-
lytic framework for assessing the broad spectrum of human-
induced risks is introduced. This approach is then applied
for three important types of human-induced hazards that are
representative for a whole class of hazards: Accidents due to
nuclear power plants (NPP) or air traffic, and terrorism.
For the analysis of accidents, risk is measured with respect
to getting injured or dying when living in certain buffer zones
around hazard locations. NPP hazard expert knowledge is
used and supplemented with observations on aging effects
leading to a proprietary index value for the risk. Air traf-
fic risk is modelled as an area related phenomenon based on
available accident statistics leading to an expected value of
risk.
Terrorism risk is assessed by the attraction certain ele-
ments (like embassies in the case of conventional threats) dis-
play in the eye of potential aggressors. For non-conventional
targets like football games, a detailed approach measuring
their susceptibility to different kinds of attacks within prede-
fined scenarios was developed; this also allows a ranking of
attack modes.
Correspondence to: D. Borst
(d.borst@fbv.uka.de)
1 State of the art of mapping man-made risks in Ger-
many
The objective of the paper is to develop a methodology for as-
sessing major man-made risks in Germany based on a spatial
analysis of their impacts on people and physical assets. Such
an approach is needed for mapping this type of risk alongside
with risks related to natural hazards. A map server solution,
the “Risk Explorer” (cf. Mu¨ller et al., 2006), will show both
natural and human-induced hazards, exposures, vulnerabili-
ties, and risks within one viewer system. This is a crucial
first step towards the integrated assessment of a multitude of
hazards. Such maps are fundamental to risk mitigation and
risk management planning at the individual, company, and
societal level – but up to date no comprehensive risk maps
are publicly available for the whole of Germany.1
In 2004, Bundesamt fu¨r Bevo¨lkerungsschutz und Katas-
trophenhilfe (BBK, Federal Office for Civil Protection and
Disaster Response) started a project to collect information
about the main hazards in each state in order to derive a
“Harmonized Hazard Assessment” for Germany. Not all
of the federal states are complied, and the incoming re-
ports differed in quantity and detail. The risk analysis of
Hessen is considered exemplary and can be accessed via
the internet (http://www.nassauischer-feuerwehrverband.de/
Downloads/KatSGefaehrdungsanalyse.pdf [17/07/2006]). It
provides some statistics and qualitative descriptions of nat-
ural hazards, technological accidents, malicious actions of
persons, hysteric behaviour at mass events, and war. It also
gives a first idea about the mitigation capacity available to
manage these risks. However, none of the hazards mentioned
is mapped or assessed in conjunction with others.
1The hazard maps of insurance companies cover a wide range of
natural hazards but do not provide information on human-induced
hazards: see, e.g., Munich Re’s Natural Hazards Assessment Net-
work (http://mrnathan.munichre.com [17/07/2006]) or Swiss Re’s
CatNet.
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Another approach considered as a pilot study for country-
wide risk mapping is the Schutzdatenatlas (Protection Data
Atlas: http://www.kfs.uni-kiel.de/∼sda/ [17/07/2006]) de-
veloped at the Disaster Research Center of the Christian-
Albrechts University of Kiel. This GIS-based platform has
been serving as a research tool for the development of meth-
ods dedicated to vulnerability analyses. As a starting point,
it relies on object data of a county (Ditmarschen) in Northern
Germany.
BBK developed DeNIS II – a geo-referenced informa-
tion system for mapping hazardous objects and events in
Germany as well as weather conditions and mitigation re-
sources. It can also integrate remote sensing data and is
available both for the federal and the state level and for non-
governmental relief organizations. The general public, how-
ever, has to rely on the web-site (http://www.denis.bund.de
[17/07/2006]) which provides links to articles and other kind
of information from various, mostly scientific, sources. Top-
ics listed range from natural disasters to chemical and nuclear
accidents, traffic accidents, terrorism, fire, and explosions.
The user is expected to integrate the information provided
and to assess his/her risk. The problems resulting from the
approach employed for the public website are evident: No-
body – neither layperson nor expert – is able to make up a
comprehensive ad hoc-assessment of the risks related to a
specific geographic area.
To sum up, there are several lacunae to be filled regard-
ing the mapping of man-made risks in Germany: First of all,
more data has to be collected for a harmonized and country-
wide hazard assessment as intended by the BBK. Second,
this data needs to be collected and analyzed following a stan-
dardized approach in order to assure its comparability across
various kinds of hazards, exposure, and vulnerability. Pub-
lic security permitting the information then has to be made
available to the public in an intelligible way.
Maps are good instruments for integrating complex
geography-related and other data, but there are hardly any
approaches for mapping man-made risks on German terri-
tory. One exception is the European Union (EU) wide re-
search program ESPON2 where partners from various Euro-
pean countries have been conducting research on natural and
technological hazards. However, due to the focus on spa-
tial planning responses, a thorough filtering of the research
objects was done which reduced the technological hazards
considered to a relatively small number including major ac-
cident hazards of Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) and chemical
plants, air traffic as well as oil processing, transport and stor-
age. “Social hazards” (following the terminology of EEA,
2003:VI) like terrorism or war have not been investigated
in detail.3 Despite limited access to data on technological
2European Spatial Planning Observation Network (ESPON):
http://www.espon.eu [17/03/2006], cf. Schmidt-Thome´ (2006).
3Risk consulting companies like Risk Management Solution
(RMS) or EQECAT, on the other hand, do offer integrated anal-
hazards (Schmidt-Thome´, 2006:65f.), the international con-
sortium was able to construct preliminary synthetical maps
regarding hazard, vulnerability, and risk for the EU 27+2.
We chose to develop our approach based on a generic
catastrophe model as used in geographic information sys-
tems. It is laid out in Sect. 2. To facilitate a comprehensive
assessment of man-made risks and their mapping by means
of more standardized data, a detailed typology of man-made
risks is presented, too. Additionally, we highlight some gen-
eral problems in assessing these risks and briefly state the
reasons for selecting certain hazards for a detailed consider-
ation within this paper. Section 3 provides an overview of the
general methodological approach used for data analysis and
visualisation of risks in maps. Section 4 explains in detail
our work done for assessing and mapping these risks. Ac-
cording to the project context, only direct loss potentials are
assessed for drawing the risk map; at the same time, consid-
erations about individual or societal risk perception have to
be disregarded. Section 5 finally provides a short summary
and gives an outlook of future research necessities and pos-
sibilities. Our analytic framework for risk specific analyses
and the mapping of selected man-made risks might serve as
a starting point for integrated risk research in this area.
2 Concept of risk
2.1 Quantitative approach for assessing and mapping man-
made risks
There is a multitude of risk concepts and a large variety of
taxonomies defining aspects like hazard, exposure or vulner-
ability. Renn (2005:114–138) gives an exhaustive overview
of the risk terminology currently used in scientific and en-
gineering literature or in documents published by interna-
tional organizations like the United Nations International
Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN/ISDR). Additionally
(multi)national approaches prepared by political or technical
government advisory bodies and standard setting committees
are presented.
For our purposes the terminology suggested by the
UN/ISDR (2004) is adequate. Even though this approach
has been developed for investigating the impact of natural
forces on humans and their socio-economic or environmen-
tal context, it can be adapted to the modelling of other kinds
of hazards and their effects. In the report risk is defined as
“the probability of harmful consequences, or expected losses
(deaths, injuries, property, livelihoods, economic activity dis-
rupted or environment damaged) resulting from interactions
between natural or human-induced hazards and vulnerable
conditions” (UN/ISDR, 2004:3).
yses of natural and man-made hazards, especially terrorism, but
no hazard or risk maps are available to the public. Recently oc-
curred catastrophic events are mapped at http://www.eqecat.com/
catWatchREV/index.cfm [17/07/2006].
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Among natural scientists, engineers, and economists, risk
is modelled as the function of an interaction between four
basic components: (1) certain hazards, (2) elements exposed
to hazardous events with specified characteristics, (3) the
susceptibility of the exposed elements to the hazardous im-
pact, and (4) the resulting consequences (see, e.g., Mech-
ler, 2004:16–20; Sinha and Goyal, 2004:107; UN/ISDR,
2004:6). Catastrophe models4 have a similar structure
(cf. Fig. 1).
In the hazard module extreme natural events such as hur-
ricanes or human-induced events due to terrorism are de-
scribed regarding cause-effect relationships. In the case of
human-induced events data is quite scarce, and the informa-
tion available might not be representative for other events to
come (Kunreuther et al., 2005:218). Additionally, human ac-
tions can be directed to produce damages of a certain extent
(such as sabotage, terrorism, and war), or they may uninten-
tionally result in damages (like accidents and gradual envi-
ronmental degradation). For estimating the frequency, sever-
ity and locations of future actions of malicious intent, input
from experts on threat assessment is needed (Kunreuther et
al., 2005:220). The modelling of accidents involves other
specific problems: In general, it is very difficult to obtain
hazard data, and the data collection process is not standard-
ized, with missing data on small-scale events.
The exposure module contains geographic data on the lo-
cation of the elements at risk (address, postal code, etc.) as
well as information on typical characteristics of the exposed
objects and subjects. This includes, e.g., the construction
type of buildings, or data regarding the average daytime pop-
ulation and the maximum capacity of schools, shopping cen-
tres or stadiums (Balmforth et al., 2005).
The creation of synthetic events is possible via probabilis-
tic models and computer simulation or by the determinis-
tic approach of scenario planning. In conjunction with the
hazard module, both approaches are able to differentiate be-
tween various qualities of events (is it an industrial accident
or vicious sabotage?), related intensities (e.g., in terms of
pressure waves of bomb blast) and estimated frequency.
Damage functions are a quantitative estimate of the impact
produced by a hazard phenomenon on the elements at risk.
Damage functions are region specific and reflect a thorough
and detailed understanding of the local conditions and prac-
tices (Clark, 2002:185). These are “determined by physical,
social, economic, and environmental factors or processes,
which increase the susceptibility of a community to the im-
pact of hazards” (UN/ISDR, 2004, vol. II:3), and thus its vul-
nerability. Location, and its mapping, is an essential compo-
4FEMA (http://www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/hazus/) offers an
open-source multi-hazard catastrophe model (HAZUS-MH MRl);
proprietary modelling software and services have been devel-
oped by AIR Worldwide (http://www.air-worldwide.com/), EQE-
CAT (http://www.eqecat.com/), and RMS (http://www.rms.com/)
[all 17/07/2006].
Vulnerabilty Loss
Hazard
Exposure
Event Creation
Damage
Function
(1)
(2)
(3) (4)
Fig. 1. Structure of risk and catastrophe models (adapted from
Grossi et al., 2005:261).
1There, components (1)–(4) are represented and “exposure” is
called “inventory”. We prefer to retain the former term as it is used
both in risk concepts and catastrophe models.
nent of vulnerability assessment. It helps to explain what
makes people and places where they live, work and play vul-
nerable to natural, technological, and purposeful threats like
terrorism (Abler and Richardson, 2003:123–126).
The definition of risk by UN/ISDR (2004) refers to direct
and indirect, economic and human losses including latent
(environmental) conditions that may represent future threats.
Not all of these can be modelled for mapping. The following
section, therefore, introduces a screening approach that ex-
plains our selection of human-induced risks based on hazard
characteristics, exposure, vulnerability, damage and losses.
Instead of the concept of losses, we mainly use a concept
of damage which is more general: Losses only contain the
economic evaluation of damage of any kind. However, this
economic aspect is not covered in this paper. We focus on
potential harm to people which is traceable in its immedi-
ate, short-term effects. These damages to life and health can,
therefore, be categorized as potential direct damages. They
are assessed in terms of their physical outcome, without a
translation into monetary values.
2.2 Selecting man-made hazards for detailed analysis
In its summary account on Germany’s hazard potential,
BBK5 (BVA, 2003:15) states that a special focus is needed
regarding major nuclear, chemical and biological accidents,
large-scale fires, heavy weather-related events like flood-
ings and storms or earthquakes, and events affecting a very
high number of people. These include military conflicts,
terrorism, sabotage, organized crime, major accidents and
havaries, extreme natural events and epidemics. This account
mirrors experiences of past events, assessments of damage
potential, and expectations regarding the risk mitigation ca-
pacity in Germany.
Not all of the hazards listed above show distinctive spa-
tial features that allow a modelling by the mapping approach
5To be consistent throughout the article, we use the current
names of the institutions involved in civil protection. Since 2004,
BBK is the follow-up institution of the Zentralstelle fu¨r Zivilschutz
(Central Institution for Civil Protection) in Germany.
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intended here6. Potentially ubiquitous and very dynamic
hazards such as military conflicts or health risks due to epi-
demics have to be represented differently for further insights.
This also relates to health hazards stemming from the former
use of asbestos in construction projects all over Germany, or
from fires of the built environment. That kind of hazard is
static but scattered over the whole country which makes it
hard to point out important localizations of potential dam-
ages.
Frequent events resulting in damages that are unlikely to
exceed the mitigation capacity of individuals, communities
or regional authorities are also not considered. This refers,
e.g., to traffic accidents on roads involving human casual-
ties.7 It has to be acknowledged, however, that the trans-
portation of hazardous materials can have disastrous conse-
quences and may affect larger areas in Germany. But again
it is ubiquitous, not publicly documented and, therefore, dif-
ficult to map.
There are other reasons for neglecting minor events when
doing research on human-induced hazards: Small incidents
in complex systems like industrial plants elude an external
observation by non-technical experts. These are hardly doc-
umented, and the information regarding small incidents is not
published.
To sum up, data availability, coping capacity, cause-effect
observations and mapping-related demands serve as exclu-
sion criteria for certain hazards. They also guide the selec-
tion process for hazards to be modelled for mapping.
Air traffic accidents have the potential of hurting a large
number of people at the same time, thus imposing high de-
mands on rescuing efforts and other risk management mea-
sures in case of secondary effects. Industrial facilities as
well, namely NPP, are potential sources of major hazardous
events. Also mass gatherings at sports or arts events, at fairs,
shopping centres or large office buildings, etc. may be af-
fected by problems of varied origin. Since a comprehen-
sive assessment of all mass rallies in Germany seems to be
an insolvable task, we decided to consider disasters at foot-
ball games as a pilot example. This also serves as prepara-
tory work for the field of malicious attacks. Another pilot
study deals with terrorist attacks on attractive targets like em-
bassies.
2.3 Hazard characteristics of man-made risks
Both the criteria used for selecting certain man-made risks
and aspects of particular relevance for risk mapping serve as
a starting point for the typology to be developed. In the fol-
6For another spatial filtering compare the ESPON 1.3.1-project
as described in Schmidt-Thome´ (2006:15).
7For assessing (and managing) societal vulnerability the fre-
quent events of road traffic accidents, occupational accidents
and traditional, everyday crime are normally excluded (Hovden,
2004:631). Societies have developed coping schemes for these risks
that are accepted to a certain extent (Starr, 1969).
lowing, accidents resulting from technical, human or organ-
isational failures are differentiated from events of deliberate
origin.
Accidents displace a normal flow of events. Failures orig-
inally happening independently of each other may coincide
in their effects, conglomerate, and reinforce or attenuate each
other, which makes their analysis quite complex.
Regarding industrial accidents, hazard identification meth-
ods based on Failure Modes and Effects Analyses, Hazard
and Operations Analysis8 may help to provide an extensive
overview of what can go wrong and how likely this might
be, but as long as human actions are integrated with technol-
ogy surprises are possible. For achieving a comprehensive
modelling of accidental man-made hazards, it is, therefore,
necessary to complement the understanding of processes by
other means (cf. Sect. 4).
This is also essential for the assessment of malicious ac-
tions. As an outcome of continuously evolving motivations
to attack they cannot be fully explained by either observ-
able events or analyses of structural vulnerabilities. Mali-
cious actions arise out of deliberate preparations of people
who are informed about the history of past attacks while tak-
ing into account possible countermeasures to fend them off.
This generates a dynamic uncertainty in time regarding all
deliberate malicious actions, and an interdependent vulnera-
bility between potential targets of terrorism. The targets who
prepare for threats are less likely to be attacked because of
heightened costs for the aggressors (Michel-Kerjan, 2003).
Consequently, this raises the probability of attacks on other
targets. But as long as potential targets are interrelated (e.g.,
by business connections or physical links like supply-chains)
the threat remains high even for the partners that do not have
to experience any direct attacks (Kunreuther and Heal, 2003).
Regarding the mapping of risk, it is important to distin-
guish the location and spatial dimensions of perils as well
as the number of possible sources of unwanted events. As-
pects with this particular relevance are highlighted by the
grey background colour in Table 1.
There are fixed locations as for accidents at industrial
plants or variable ones as in the case of air traffic accidents
that can literally occur anywhere. The boundaries with re-
spect to spatial dimensions may be marked by the location of
a hazard itself (accident in a football arena), but others like
hazardous releases from chemical plants may spread past the
zoning of the source. The number of possible locations of a
certain type of hazard ranges from only a few as in the case of
nuclear power plants in Germany to an unmanageably high
number of, e.g., chemical, facilities using or producing haz-
ardous materials.
Concerning temporal aspects of hazards, the time of occur-
rence can either be restricted – for example to the schedule of
mass rally events – or be variable as for accidents at industrial
8A short overview of various approaches in quantitative risk
analyses is presented by Kaplan et al. (2001).
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Table 1. Hazard characteristics of man-made risks (grey background and bold fonts imply aspects of particular relevance for risk mapping
and criteria used for selecting certain man-made risks, respectively).
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partners that do not have to experience any direct attacks (Kunreuther and Heal, 2003). 
Regarding the mapping of risk, it is important to distinguish the location and spatial dimen-
sions of perils as well as the number of possible sources of unwanted events. Aspects with 
this particular relevance are highlighted by the grey background colour in Table 1. 
Table 1. Hazard characteristics of man-made risks (grey background and bold fonts imply 
aspects of particular relevance for risk mapping and criteria used for selecting certain man-
made risks, respectively) 
Domain Attribute Characteristic values 
kind malicious, accidental 
intensity strong (disastrous) weak 
location variable (anywhere) fixed 
number of locations many places few places 
spatial dimension wide-ranging, spreading punctual 
time variable (anytime) fixed / at limited 
times 
duration long-lasting (e.g., 
permanent emissions) 
short-term 
frequency / probability frequent / high 
probability 
rare / unlikely 
Hazard 
variability / dynamics high moderate 
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plants that may happen any time. The duration of a hazard
may range from short-term (for most of man-made risks) to
long-lasting as in continuous emission of small amounts of
radiation to the environment by a nuclear power plant.
A fact of great influence on risk assessment is the fre-
quency of a hazard ranging from very rare to rather frequent
events with low to high probability, respectively. Whereas
a maximum credible nuclear accident can be considered un-
likely on German territory, cases of fire are happening quite
frequently, therefore displaying a high probability. At the
same time, they can be managed to a large extent with the
existing resources provided.
One aspect that marks a clear distinction between acci-
dental risks and risks of malicious nature is the dynamics of
hazards. Most man-made perils change moderately over time
as a result of technological and other developments – the use
of larger aircrafts and the global increase of travellers result
in a shift of the hazard in the domain of air traffic accidents.
Terrorism, however, can alter almost immediately, e.g., by
changes in the doctrines of the assaulters regarding the usage
of weapons of mass destruction. The dynamics of terrorism
risk is, therefore, immensely high.
As explained before (and highlighted in Table 1 in bold),
we have chosen to concentrate our efforts on hazards of dis-
astrous intensity. Realizations thereof are rare, and especially
the short-term consequences ask for coordinated prepara-
tions to manage the risk. Our contribution consists in the
mapping of the selected hazards.
2.4 Exposure, vulnerability and damages in the domain of
man-made risks
Special characteristics of human-induced risks are not re-
stricted to the hazard domain; they also extend to aspects
of exposure, vulnerability and damages. These are listed in
Table 2 and, once again, aspects with a special relevance for
mapping are highlighted in grey.
Regarding exposure, a basic distinction is given by the
different kinds of elements at risk which comprehend hu-
mans, the environment, physical assets like buildings, pro-
duction processes and cultural values. Traffic accidents and
mass rally events tend to primarily generate human casual-
ties whereas industrial accidents have the potential to addi-
tionally harm assets, production processes and the environ-
ment. In the case of terrorism, cultural values form an im-
portant part of exposure. As the undermining of society by
the means of attacking its fundamental values forms one part
of the bundle of aims of the assaulters (OECD, 2003:104;
Laqueur, 2003), they accordingly choose their targets.
Due to differences in spatial dimensions, the granularity
of risk-prone areas varies. At least two cases can be distin-
guished:
– man-made risks with the potential of affecting extended
geographical areas, like accidents in NPP,
– events happening on a limited local dimension, espe-
cially when a major part of the elements at risk is rep-
resented by the hazardous object or system itself, for
example the venues of mass gatherings like football sta-
diums.
In the first case, it is efficient and thus reasonable to use
general exposure data like the stock of residential buildings
or population density as compiled by Kleist et al. (2006)
or INFAS Geodaten (2001), respectively. General exposure
data is commonly available at the level of communities as the
finest resolution. This, however, is too aggregate for small-
scale events. Regarding elements affected at a local level,
www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/6/779/2006/ Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 6, 779–802, 2006
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Table 2. Characteristics of exposure, vulnerability and damages regarding man-made risks (grey background and bold fonts imply aspects
of particular relevance for risk mapping and criteria used for selecting certain man-made risks, respectively).
2.4 Exposure, vulnerability and damages in the domain of man-made risks 
Special characteristics of human-induced risks are not restricted to the hazard domain; they 
also extend to aspects of exposure, vulnerability and damages. These are listed in Table 2 and, 
once again, aspects with a special relevance for mapping are highlighted in grey. 
Table 2. Characteristics of exposure, vulnerability and damages regarding man-made risks 
(grey background and bold fonts imply aspects of particular relevance for risk mapping and 
criteria used for selecting certain man-made risks, respectively) 
Domain Attribute Characteristic values 
elements at risk human, environment, physical assets, production 
processes, cultural values 
Exposure 
granularity general local 
degree of structural 
vulnerability of elements 
at risk with respect to 
each hazard 
very vulnerable to all 
kinds of hazards 
no structural 
vulnerability to many 
hazards 
Vulnerability 
distance of object / 
person to origin of hazard
close remote 
Damages kind direct/indirect: physical, psychological, 
economical, political, societal  
 temporal aspects of 
occurrence 
delayed, long-lasting immediate, short-
term 
 traceability non-traceable traceable (clear 
cause-effect-
relationship)  
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which comprehend humans, the environment, physical assets like buildings, production 
processes and cultural values. Traffic accidents and mass rally events tend to primarily gener-
ate human casualties whereas industrial accidents have the potential to additionally harm 
assets, production processes and the environment. In the case of terrorism, cultural values 
form an important part of exposure. As the undermining of society by the means of attacking 
its fundamental values forms one part of the bundle of aims of the assaulters (OECD, 2003: 
104; Laqueur, 2003), they accordingly choose their targets. 
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this information is not suffi iently precise; the sam holds
true when a detailed analysis of possible local effects of a
large-scale event is intended. Hence, it is necessary to com-
plement general aggregate data with a regional stock of expo-
sure, which means that an additional case-specific inventory
of individual elements at risk has to be built up. Thieken t
al. (2006) provides such a mapping approach to disaggregate
exposure data for all the communities in Germany.
For several reasons, vulnerability marks the most difficult
topic within the context of mapping human-induced risks:
First of all, its degree is distance-related – it is generally in-
creasing with a declining physical distance to the possible
locale of an accident or malicious attack. An object close to
a road but far away from railway lines would thus be more
vulnerable to car accidents than to railway accidents. Some
hazards like air traffic, however, are not locally bound inas-
much as they cover extended geographic areas. Additionally,
risk can be altered by the exposed elements themselves. For
example, the vulnerability of football fans to a harmful event
taking place in a stadium undoubtedly depends on their deci-
sion of becoming a participating spectator of a certain match
or not.
Even though the points mentioned above also apply to nat-
ural hazards, they pose a special problem for the mapping of
man-made risks. This is related to the very heterogeneous
hazard characteristics. In theory, vulnerability has to be de-
fined with respect to each specific form of hazard, which we
will name “structural vulnerability”.9 Protection measures
9The intrinsic vulnerability of a person or an object that is
related to the condition of being young or old, strong or weak,
that m y, e.g., prevent the intrusion of fire into a house might
be ineffective against toxic substances, therefore leaving the
house vulnerable to the latter peril.
But considerations that detailed are hardly feasible within
the scope of risk assessment intended here, i.e. covering the
whole f Germany: The necessary inventory of exposure
would not only have to include the geographical location of
all elements at risk, one by one, but also information on its
characteristics with respect to structural vulnerability of all
man-made risks considered. Therefore, the development of
a methodology to assess the risks has do be done for specific
types of hazards10, and starting at selected areas of limited
dimensions that will be gradually expanded.
Another reason for being selective is that it is very hard
to get statistical data or detailed case studies on the elements
at risk actually affected by a human-induced disaster. Di-
rect losses might be documented, but reports hardly reveal
aspects like the distance to the locale of an event or criteria
with respect to structural vulnerability. Especially data on
elements sensitive to terrorist actions such as critical infras-
tructure is confidential (Kunreuther et al., 2005:220). Data
gaps, therefore, have to be filled: The vulnerability stem-
retrofitted or not, is part of the structural vulnerability and deter-
mines the amount, kind and quality of risk mitigation necessary.
10The typology presented here is intended to facilitate risk map-
ping. It is developed from a hazard point of view. Other approaches
– like the one used in the ESPON 1.3.1.-report (Schmidt-Thome´,
2006) – are based on the risk perspective concept as suggested by
the WBGU (2000). That concept allows highlighting specific in-
terrelations between hazards, risk perception and societal response.
For an application to systemic risks cf. Klinke and Renn (2006).
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ming from a hazard is estimated by designing appropriate
proxy parameters from the available data. Coarse estimates
during the early stages of our research, in conjunction with
greater uncertainties, can be improved along with the knowl-
edge developed over time.
Another view on the risks is provided by dealing with the
realisation thereof, i.e. the respective outcome of disasters.
Damages may be categorized depending on their kind or on
temporal aspects of occurrence and traceability. For all dis-
astrous accidents and malicious actions that might happen
in Germany, the damages can consist to an important extent
of human casualties surpassing those with respect to physi-
cal assets. Although psychological consequences and socio-
economic damages form an important part of the outcome
of disasters, especially in the case of accidents in nuclear
power plants and also terrorism, they are beyond the focus of
the “Risk Map Germany” (RM) research framework. This is
also the case regarding delayed effects with respect to human
health that may be connected to immissions of toxic agents
resulting from accidents in chemical facilities or NPP. The
limited traceability of adverse effects to particular events,
combined with difficulties to record potential causes and ef-
fects and to evaluate them statistically, forces us to exclude
this aspect of human-induced risks from mapping. Only the
direct damages/casualties to the people living around the haz-
ardous object are considered.
Many man-made hazards like traffic accidents or mass
rally events primarily produce direct kinds of damages such
as vehicle or cargo destruction and human casualties. Espe-
cially industrial risks like NPP and chemical facilities have
the potential to trigger major additional indirect damages due
to the interruption of their business and the one of business
partners or of normal life in the affected area. Aside from the
economic damages due to activity reduction and follow-up
effects (unemployment, emigration, living expense surges,
real estate depreciation), further consequences occur when
critical functions are hit that have to be re-established as
quickly as possible.
Terrorism is special in so far as its consequences are di-
rectly linked to the form of attack chosen by the assaulters
and, therefore, hard to predict. However, it can be assumed
that a huge proportion of indirect damages might be a prior
intention by certain assaulters. These happen when important
structural elements like traffic nodes (e.g., railway stations)
are hit. Another form of indirect damage of terrorist acts (in-
cluding sheer threatening) is marked by psychological con-
sequences. However, for maintaining the comparability with
research on natural catastrophes within RM we only consider
direct damages. For accidental risks, they are assessed as po-
tential human casualties, and for terrorist threats they enter as
an important factor determining the attractiveness of certain
targets.
Collection of hazard related data
Processing of the data (modelling, calculations)
Storage in electronic tables
Import into Database
Connect to Geographical Information System
Spatial analysis
Visualization in maps
geographic & population data CEDIM
data
center
hazard & other exposure dataexternal
data
sources
Fig. 2. Flowchart for the visualisation of information.
3 Processing and visualization of information
The presented typology of risks clearly shows that human-
induced risks are very heterogeneous. As a consequence,
it is hard to find spanning scientific concepts and studies as
well as detailed overall event data for this field of research.
Haimes (1998) gives a comprehensive summary of work in
risk assessment in general.
In order to implement the risk analysis concept through
mapping, Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and
database systems are widely used. Our data collected from
diverse sources is processed for modelling and calculation
purposes. If necessary, extraterritorial experiences serve as
a backup for the collection of corresponding German data at
the micro-, meso- and macro level. Data collection, process-
ing and visualization procedures are illustrated in Fig. 2.
Hazard and exposure related statistical data are collected
from both primary and secondary sources including the inter-
net and concerned organisations such as authorities or com-
panies. The data of potentially hazardous objects or ex-
posed elements (stadiums, NPP, etc.) include real world ge-
ographic coordinates, addresses, and hazard specific infor-
mation which are stored in tables (Microsoft Excel). After-
wards, they are imported into a database management system
software (MySQL) for further analysis and data base opera-
tions before being included into the GIS software (ESRI11
ArcGIS) for spatial analyses.
Different geo-data such as administrative boundaries, road
network, rivers, digital elevation models as well as popula-
tion data at different resolutions within the spatial framework
of Germany are gathered internally from the CEDIM data
center and handled with ArcGIS software.
ArcGIS provides various facilities for the spatial analysis
and visualization of data: The buffer function, e.g., allows
to create buffer polygons to a specified distance around an
input feature. We use this in order to model air traffic risk by
designing buffers around airports (cf. Sect. 4.2). The overlay
11Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI), one of the
world’s leading GIS software companies, developed ArcGIS: An in-
tegrated collection of GIS software products (http://www.esri.com
[17/07/2006]).
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Table 3. Factors influencing the hazard of radioactive releases from German NPP at facility level.
Influencing factor Mode of influence Characteristic values in
Germany1
Power2 The maximum quantity of radioactivity to be released from a
NPP depends on its inventory. More power means a bigger
inventory (not proportional, though, as both technology and
efficiency of the plant must be taken into account).
The NPP have an electri-
cal power of 806 MW up to
1400 MW.
Reactor type3 In Germany two different types exist: Pressurized water reac-
tors (PWR) and boiling water reactors (BWR). PWR are in-
trinsically safer because they have two separate cooling water
circulations, the steam in the reactor is from a separate source
and the special construction cares for a falling pressure with
a rising temperature.
11 PWR, 6 BWR
Age4 Aging in NPP causes different problems:
- Technical: Mechanical components, buildings and built in-
frastructure, electronic and information technologies
- Operation systems
- Documentation
- Maintaining quality of staff (loss of employees, difficulties
in finding well-educated personnel)
In 2005 the NPP had an
average age of 23.4 years,
with the oldest one being
built in 1974, the most re-
cent one in 1989.
1 Cf. Bundesamt fu¨r Strahlenschutz (BfS, Federal Office for Radiation Protection) – Kernkraftwerke in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
(Nuclear Power Plants in Germany), http://www.bfs.de/kerntechnik/ereignisse/standorte/karte kw.html [17/03/2006].
2 Own consideration and comparison with the exposure rates of NPP in normal operation as published by Koelzer (2005).
3 Technical details can be found at http://www.wien.gv.at/wua/atom/glossar/s.htm and http://leifi.physik.uni-muenchen.de/web ph10/
umwelt-technik/13kkw/index.htm [both 17/03/2006].
4 Cf. considerations of RSK (2004).
function combines different layers and creates a new layer
with combined attributes. For example, after having created a
buffer zone around NPP, it can be overlaid with a population
density layer to extract further attributes (cf. Sect. 4.1).
Thus, the spatial analysis functionality of GIS can reveal
new aspects, and thereby help to analyse and understand the
effects of any disaster. This may improve the risk modelling
process. In addition, the GIS facilitates the illustration of
hazard, exposure, and risk by various maps that can be cre-
ated within the computer system.
4 The implementation of the risk assessment concept:
mapping man-made risks
4.1 Nuclear power plants
At present, 17 NPP with a total power of 21 GW are operat-
ing in Germany. The German government has decided to de-
commission all German NPP within the next twenty years12
due to the aging of the facilities, extensive public discussion
12Deutscher Bundestag: Gesetz zur geordneten Beendigung der
Kernenergienutzung zur gewerblichen Erzeugung von Elektrizita¨t.
(German Parliament: Law concerning the orderly termination of
nuclear energy usage for commercial production of electricity)
on the safety of these plants and problems with safe storage
of atomic wastes. As long as these governmental plans are
not fully carried through, it is worthwhile to consider this
wide-ranging hazard. We focus on short-term effects of pos-
sible, although low-probability, releases of radioactive sub-
stances during continuous operation.
4.1.1 State of the art and results of previous risk assess-
ments
The hazardousness of NPP originates from potential releases
of radioactive substances. It is affected by the amount of
radioactive materials contained in the facilities and by their
technical standards regarding substance release prevention.
Institutions like the Gesellschaft fu¨r Anlagen- und Reaktor-
sicherheit (GRS, Society for Facility and Reactor Safety) –
a German organization responsible for supervising technical
aspects of nuclear power plants – have been publishing de-
tailed studies about safety issues in such facilities (cf. GRS,
2005). Based on these studies we derive some primary fac-
tors influencing the hazard of radioactive releases in German
NPP. They are shown in Table 3.
Since 2002, the GRS has begun a probabilistic safety anal-
ysis (PSA), a far-reaching concept for the assessment of the
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technical safety for all German NPP13. PSA is meant to es-
timate the likelihood of an accident with damage to the core
of the reactor or one that cannot be enshrined by the internal
safety barriers of the plant, respectively. The estimates are
made by looking at both the technical components of the re-
actor and the safety barriers for each scenario defined. A
methodology including large event trees and several com-
puter models is used to analyse possible events of impor-
tance. Although the methodology by itself is probabilistic,
the results are not: Only few likelihood values for certain de-
terministic events are given without distinguishing between
different release intensities. This does not allow any further
probabilistic analysis of the release hazard. The probability
for core melt phenomena (core damage frequency, CDF, as
one kind of events considered) of all intensities of a German
NPP lies between 2.0E-07 and 5.3E-06 per year. Figure 3
gives some examples of CDF values for German plants.
PSA allows figuring out and improving the problems
which the technical safety concept might include (cf. Berg,
2004). But PSA does not yet contain information on other
factors relevant to the hazard of radioactive releases. For ex-
ample, the source term (or its probability function, respec-
tively) is determined by constructional characteristics of the
reactor like its type and electrical power produced. These are
incorporated into PSA whereas the factor “type of incident”
is only partly worked in. The aging of NPP (cf. Smith et al.,
2001)14 as well as human mistakes and errors in connexion
with the general safety management in plants are also not
covered. As a consequence, there is, e.g., continuous effort
to systematically incorporate aging phenomena into the de-
termination of PSA values. In Europe, a research “Network
on Incorporating Ageing Effects into Probabilistic Safety
Assessment (APSA)” funded by EU has started to address
this task since 2004.15 Regarding the safety management or
safety culture in the operating company, Mu¨ller et al. (1998)
and Sorenson (2002) conclude that human aspects should be
considered an integral part of safety systems. They show
up in organizational performance and individual striving for
safety in the work area. Employees leaving the NPP take
away a lot of valuable knowledge. Therefore, it is necessary
to train the staff continuously and to educate new personnel.
The last part of this claim is a problem for German plants be-
cause of the intended shutdowns of NPP which makes these
jobs less attractive. According to our own findings,16 19.9%
13For an overview on foundations and methods of PSA as a stan-
dardized successor of former probabilistic approaches called Prob-
abilistic Risk Analysis, cf. Bedford and Cooke (2001).
14One problem with respect to aging of the plants is that they
contain steel reactors that wear out. The microscopic splitting of a
steel reactor can only be measured by complicated analyses.
15 APSA website: http://www.energyrisks.jrc.nl/APSA/
[19/03/2006].
16Calculations based on http://www.bfs.de/kerntechnik/
ereignisse/berichte [19/03/2006].
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NPP are Grohnde, Grafenrheinfeld, Philippsburg 2, and Brokdorf.
Fig. 3. PSA results for German NPP. Data source: Bundesamt fu¨r
Strahlenschutz (BfS, Federal Office for Radiation Protection).
of unwanted events (reportable events, cf. Sect. 4.1.3) in Ger-
man NPP during the period of 1994–2004 were caused by
human errors and mistakes.
Despite their omissions and limitations, concepts like PSA
have been forming the basis of advanced technical studies
regarding the risk of NPP. Some studies – for example, US
NRC (1990) – are very complex and require lots of technical
knowledge as well as an extensive amount of data. Consider-
ing the fact that this data is not always available in the qual-
ity needed for detailed analysis, other studies like Schmidt-
Thome´ (2006) use simplified concepts and indicators.
The ESPON-project as outlined in Schmidt-Thome´ (2006)
is a study covering risks of different hazards. It uses a very
simple hazard indicator with respect to NPP, namely the ex-
istence of a plant in operation. Based on the experiences of
the Chernobyl accident, it is assumed that a NPP imposes a
very high hazard for its immediate neighbourhood within a
radius of 30 km, a medium hazard for the surrounding area of
up to 300 km and no hazard for greater distances. Vulnerabil-
ity is not modelled case-specifically with respect to different
hazards in this study.
The study of Kromp et al. (1999) is a recent example for
detailed hazard research based on quantitative safety anal-
ysis values like PSA. It was done on behalf of the Expert
Authority of the ¨Osterreichisches Umweltbundesamt (Aus-
trian Federal Office for Environmental Protection and Con-
trol). The authors investigate the probability of radiological
exposure stemming from all European NPP. With respect to
the likelihood of release events, the study uses values gener-
ated probabilistically similar to PSA17. The source term of all
substances and their amounts released, thereby determining
the local intensity of a radioactive hazard, is given by em-
ploying one typical scenario. The subsequent deposition of
nuclear substances to the ground is calculated by using a sim-
ulation of certain meteorological conditions determining the
17One part of the study uses Large Release Frequencies for each
reactor type, which are derived from CDF values. In another part,
calculations are based on a value given by the International Atomic
Energy Agency as a guidance level for any reactor type.
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Fig. 4. Number of reportable events of German NPP between 1994
and 2004 (Data: BfS).
spreading of radioactive agents. As a result, the researchers
created a map showing the geographical distribution of the
probability of being exposed to radioactivity, and tables indi-
cating the radiological exposure of various countries. Unfor-
tunately, the study is almost completely limited to the hazard
part of the risk and – with the only exception of a value of
soil contamination – neglects the elements at risk exposed to
it (like humans and property), and their vulnerability.
Since there is usually no direct damage to property due to
radioactivity releases except to the plant area itself we fo-
cus on humans with respect to exposure and vulnerability.
Complex connexions in the absorption of radiation doses by
the human body may generate a broad array of medical con-
ditions. At least two assessment strategies regarding health
risks can be discerned in the literature: A very detailed ap-
proach is used, e.g., by BMU (2001) or US NRC (1990), and
a simplified approach is used by Weil (2003).
Weil (2003), head of the core safety department of the BfS,
assesses the monetary value of health risks and property dam-
age for the hazard scenario of a major accident at the German
NPP located in Biblis. The health risk considered is defined
as the danger of getting cancer, which leads to costs for treat-
ment or lethal consequences. For determining health risks
Weil (2003) does neither differentiate between ways of in-
corporation of radioactivity nor between certain groups of
the population as stemming from gender and age, but just
gives an average percentage of people affected. This ratio is
multiplied with the number of the local population. Together
with assumptions on treatment costs and costs of lethality as
given by Ottinger et al. (1990) and Hohmeyer (1989), the
sum of health costs is obtained and added to the costs due to
property damages.
BMU (2001), in contrast, demonstrate clearly that calcu-
lating health effects and health costs from radiological activ-
ity rates can be an extremely complex task. They distinguish
between different medical mechanisms caused by different
forms of incorporation of radioactivity to the human body –
via external radiation, breathing and ingestion – while con-
sidering that these effects are also influenced by dose mitiga-
tion measures of emergency response actions.
Another study, US NRC (1990:3–17), which includes both
hazard and vulnerability assessment, distinguishes four types
of indicators for determining the vulnerability of humans to-
wards radioactive releases, i.e. early fatality risk, latent can-
cer fatality risk, population dose within 50 miles of the site
and population dose within the entire site region. The values,
however, are calculated only for certain US-plants and they
are based on assumptions covering both the local technical
plant features as well as their environment. Consequently,
the assessment cannot be directly transferred to the German
context. Furthermore, the calculations are, again, quite com-
plex and go beyond the scope of this study.
4.1.2 Data for assessing the risk of NPP
Existing PSA values for German NPP can serve as a basis
for hazard assessment. Since this primary indicator has some
shortcomings, we have looked for data in support of other ap-
proaches suitable to flank PSA values. Besides that, Green-
peace states a critical view of relying solely on this main-
stream indicator and shows contradictory study results with
respect to the assessment of nuclear risk (cf. Greenpeace,
1998).
Since 1975, BfS has constantly supervised the nuclear fa-
cilities and regularly informed the public about all German
NPP both on basic technical data like reactor types, inven-
tory, starting time of operation and age, respectively, as well
as on their findings regarding the safety of the plants. Back-
ing their work, by the act of law a reporting system was
installed to document safety problems, enabling the BfS to
publish descriptive findings from statistical evaluations on
reported incidents.
In the case of an unwanted event taking place in a facil-
ity, the operating company (operator) is obliged to report to
the BfS (reportable events). The operator documents, catego-
rizes and publishes these events in order to improve the safety
status in the plants. The German scaling system for these re-
portable events is categorized into 4 levels: S, Sofortmeldung
(immediate notification); E, Eilmeldung (urgent notification,
report within 24 h after the event); N, Normalmeldung (nor-
mal notification, 5 days) and V, Vor Beladung des Reaktors
(before charging the reactor, 10 days). The internationally
applied INES (International Nuclear Events Scale) system
differs from the German scaling as it is using a numerical
system: No significance (category 0), termed incidents (1–
3), and termed accidents (4–7).
Between 1994 and 2004, according to BfS, German NPP
reported 2300 events but none was categorised higher than
INES 2, as illustrated in Fig. 4.
We use this data on reportable events along with informa-
tion about the age of NPP for constructing our hazard assess-
ment model. For mapping vulnerability, we rely on infor-
mation available within the CEDIM framework: This data
consists of areas of homogeneous mean population densi-
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ties18 within the communities as calculated by Thieken et
al. (2006). Their study is based on information on residential
population provided by INFAS Geodaten (2001) as well as
on land use information developed by the European project
CORINE land cover (CLC).
4.1.3 Methods for assessing and mapping the nuclear risk
in Germany
Despite the limitations already discussed in Sect. 4.1.1, some
results of former studies on nuclear risk are fundamental to
the development of our methodology for assessing and map-
ping the risk of NPP in Germany.
In our studies done on NPP aging19 the following contin-
gency between the frequency of reportable events of INES 1
and 2 and the facilities’ age can be observed.
Figure 5 shows the number of reports in German reactors
which are categorized into age-classes for a better overview.
In Germany, 17 NPP are in operation, none is older than 32
years and none is younger than 14 years20. The reports of all
NPP counted over a period of the last 11 years are used. They
are categorized as INES 1 or 2 without exception. The differ-
ence in severity of these categories is taken into account by
a weighting factor two for INES 2 events which means that
these events are counted twice. Although the set of NPP is
small, Fig. 5 clearly shows that the older reactors have more
reportable events. This is in line with research conducted on
aging of NPP in different parts of the world: With respect to
the risk of core damages, studies mention “from 10 to more
than 1000% [of] increasing by year in operation” (Vesely et
al., 1990 as cited in IRSN, 2005:16) for CDF. For our hazard
assessment we, therefore, include a correction factor based
on empirical findings reflecting the age of the facilities.
The hazard per se is of international dimensions, espe-
cially due to the influence of meteorological conditions such
as direction and speed of wind, stability of atmospheric lay-
ers, humidity, and rainfall. Together they form a very com-
plex interplay of factors impinging on the dispersion of the
nuclear agent. Kromp et al. (1999) argue conclusively that
up to 89 percent of the probability of radiological exposure
in Germany stem from foreign countries. Unfortunately, this
has to be considered a rough estimate, as the data on NPP
in foreign countries, if available at all, are not directly com-
parable to the data on German reactors, thus imposing great
uncertainties with respect to this hazard. As there is hardly
any justification to model the dispersion of radioactivity for
18A homogeneous mean population density is assumed in areas
with the same land use. The mean values are corrected per commu-
nity.
19While most international studies on this topic like Smith et
al. (2001) are cause-based, i.e. an aging reliability-physics model
is applied to the existing PSA risk model, our approach, on the con-
trary, is effect-based.
20In 2004, source: http://www.bfs.de/kerntechnik/ereignisse/
standorte/karte kw.html [19/03/2006].
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Germany without detailed information from abroad, we con-
fi ourselves to the local areas, which would b undoubt-
edly and sev rely affected by a radioactive release. In BMU
(2001), a buffer zone with a radius of 30 km around a plant
is proposed for immediate action regarding protection mea-
sures.21 We introduce the same buffer zone in our modelling
and mapping approach.
To sum up our considerations on the choice of an appropri-
ate mo l, we decided to use a simple hazard m del based on
information available for Germany, i.e. PSA values and age
data combined with empirical findings on the number of in-
cidents, resulting in the following index:
Hazard index h=f (PSA, ag factor) (1)
In detail, we use an age factor reflecting the relative in-
crease in reportable events for NPP of different age classes
compared to the youngest cluster. These factors ranging from
1 fo the most recently built class of reactors to 3.622 for
the oldest NPP are multiplied with the PSA value for each
plant. The resulting values are then normalised, i.e. the high-
est value is given the index value 1 while the other values are
adjusted accordingly.23 Consequently, the “safest” plant is
assigned an index value of only 0.0146 in comparison with
1.00 for the most hazard prone one.
As we do not model dispersion effects, we cannot calcu-
late detailed health risk and consequently only include the
predecessor of such calculations in our vulnerability model,
namely values of population densities. This results in the
following index:
Vulnerability index v=f (population density within
a radius of 30 km around NPP) (2)
21This is the same radius as chosen for evacuation following the
Chernobyl accident.
22The NPP pertaining to the oldest age-class had to report on
average 3.6 times as many events as the most recently built NPP,
i.e. 4.5 reports/1.25 reports.
23The respective product of PSA and age factor is divided by the
highest value calculated.
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Fig. 6. Local risk map around the nuclear power plants Neckarwestheim 1, Neckarwestheim 2 and Philippsburg 2.
Population density values in Germany vary between 0 and
14 419 inhabitants per km2 for areas of homogeneous mean
population density within a community as given by Thieken
et al. (2006). This data is again normalised for mapping pur-
poses to obtain values between 0 and 1.24
For calculating the final risk index r within the buffer
zones, we multiply the hazard index values h and the vul-
nerability index values v. Due to the normalisation effected
in the former steps, this results in very low values of magni-
tudes smaller than one. That is why this product is multiplied
by 10 000 for displaying purposes, leading to the formula:
Risk index r=h ∗ v ∗ 10 000 (3)
24As mentioned before, these values only reflect the residential
population, which means at night-time. People moving in or out of
certain areas during day-time – for work, school, shopping, etc. –
are not registered. For a more detailed approach see Balmforth et
al. (2005).
4.1.4 Results of the risk assessment
Looking at the spatial distribution of NPP reveals that most
of them are located at the northernmost and southernmost
parts of Germany with some agglomeration at a very close
distance to each other. Figure 6 – as an example of the re-
sults of this risk assessment process – shows the environment
of three German reactors at Neckarwestheim and Philipps-
burg including both hazard and vulnerability information.
Within a radius of 50 km of these plants one further reactor
(Philippsburg 1) cannot be taken into account due to missing
PSA values (although PSA values exist for all 17 NPP, they
have been published only for 10 NPP so far), a second one
(Obrigheim) was decommissioned in May 2005.
It is evident that some cities25 are located within the buffer
zones of 30 km around the NPP. Their population is endan-
gered, therefore, by nuclear accidents. In the exemplary case
25These are Karlsruhe, Mannheim, Ludwigshafen and Heidel-
berg in the case of NPP Philippsburg and Stuttgart in the case of
NPP Neckarwestheim.
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mapped in Fig. 6, the values of the risk index r vary between
below 1 (very low risk) for nearly one fourth of the cases
and above 1000 (high risk) for the top 3.6 percent, the ma-
jority of the values (64%) being at a low to medium level of
risk between 1 and 100. Although many densely populated
cities are located near the Philippsburg plant, the highest in-
dex value within these cities is 139 (for parts of Heidelberg),
at a medium level of risk. This is due to the low hazard in-
dex value h for NPP Philippsburg (0.018) which is nearly 24
times lower than the sum of those for the Neckarwestheim
plants (0.421+0.015=0.436). Consequently, areas with con-
siderably higher values of risk (above 3000) are located in
Stuttgart, Ludwigsburg, Heilbronn, and Fellbach where both
hazard and vulnerability values are elevated. The risk index
values for the area located in the intersection of the buffer
zones around the NPP are still low because of the very low
population density there.
4.1.5 Discussion of the NPP risk assessment approach
The methodology and parameters chosen for building our
risk index are subject to discussion. Within a multi-hazard
study of limited scope, the degree of detail in the assessment
of hazard, vulnerability and risk has to be chosen carefully.
For the hazard assessment regarding plant safety, it seems
reasonable to draw upon the scientifically accepted concept
of PSA supplying individual values for each reactor. Other
approaches use no distinction between different plants as in
Schmidt-Thome´ (2006) or only values for certain reference
NPP and minimum safety goal values, respectively (Kromp
at al., 1999). Adding correction factors based on statistical
findings can help to overcome the problem of passing over
aging effects by PSA. Nevertheless, the use of PSA for Ger-
man NPP is limited due to the nondisclosure of the results
for some plants thus restricting the implementation of the
methodology for whole Germany as for now. Further re-
search should incorporate all existing values.
Regarding the vulnerability assessment, we use population
density information at the highest resolution available for dif-
ferentiation with respect to this parameter. Since a more de-
tailed assessment of the vulnerability of people by in-depth
medical considerations cannot be part of this study, it is left to
further research. One step that should also be included in fu-
ture research is a consideration regarding the whereabouts of
people during day-time. Other very important aspects within
the risk of NPP are indirect economic effects, which are to
be subsumed under vulnerability assessment, too. However,
within the first stage of the framework of the overall CEDIM
project they are not included in the considerations.
As a conclusion, the risk index is a simple approach for
assessing the risk due to NPP. It is specifically adopted to the
characteristics of this very complex form of risk and, there-
fore, hardly comparable to our assessment of other forms of
man-made perils.
4.2 Air traffic
In Germany, there are 17 international airports (as of 2004)
and some regional airports handling in total about 2.7 mil-
lion Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flights26 per year as well
as even more small airports exclusively used for air sports
purposes. Deutsche Flugsicherung (DFS, German Organi-
sation for Flight Security) controls and guides the non-sport
flights from start till landing. The number of flights as well
as of passengers and goods transported has been dynamically
growing (on average by 5.3 percent per year within the last
20 years; DFS, 2005). Thus, the structure of air traffic has
been changing, too: Low fare airlines have entered the mar-
ket once dominated by mostly state-owned airlines, also di-
verting some traffic from main airports within metropolitan
areas to more or less remote regional airports that are often
subsidized by local state governments. Due to the difficult
economic situation of these regional airports – depending on
subsidies and the continuous devotion of few low fare air-
lines making up the main share of their business – it is hard
to predict their future and thus the accurate regional distribu-
tion of flights in Germany. Apart from decentralized traffic,
the big airports too have seen substantial growth and there
have been constant construction works going on at many of
them to cope with the increasing competition and volume
of flights. In consequence of these structural changes, the
following assessment of the regional distribution of risk due
to air traffic has to be seen as a temporary snap-shot. The
assessment method, however, can be further developed and
used for risk updates.
4.2.1 State of the art of assessment of air traffic risk
Over the years, there have been common efforts of govern-
ment authorities, science and the commercial stakeholders of
air traffic (aircraft industry, airlines, airports, air traffic con-
trols) to reduce the hazard due to air traffic despite the in-
crease in traffic volume. In Germany, Bundesstelle fu¨r Flug-
unfalluntersuchung (BFU, German Federal Bureau of Air-
craft Accidents Investigation) is in charge of collecting data
on civil air traffic accidents and the investigation thereof. On
the European level, within the conjoint project European Co-
ordination Centre for Aviation Incident Reporting Systems
(ECCAIRS)27 of the membership countries, a databank sys-
tem has been developed for the collection and analysis of air
traffic accidents. In the US, extensive data on such accidents
as well as on near misses is stored in specific databases estab-
lished by the National Aviation Safety Data Analysis Center
(NASDAC) as part of the Federal Aviation Administration28.
26IFR: Flights are operated using the plane’s instruments, not
only human sight.
27Website: http://eccairs-www.jrc.it/Start.asp [20/03/2006].
28Aviation Accident and Incident Data System (AIDS), Aviation
Safety Reporting System (ASRS), Near Midair Collision System
(NMACS). Available via https://www.nasdac.faa.gov [21/12/2005].
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Besides the official data collections, several private inter-
net databases offer a reliable service as sources of informa-
tion on air traffic accidents from all over the globe. These are,
inter alia, Aviation Safety Network, PlaneCrashInfo.com,
and AirDisaster.com29 which contain both statistics of acci-
dents and reports of single crashes. Other institutions collect-
ing and analysing data are aircraft producers like Boeing30
who also publish statistics on this topic.
Data are appraised by authorities and the research commu-
nity. BFU, for example, has been producing and publishing
annual reports for Germany containing statistical informa-
tion on the characteristics of accidents since 1990 (cf. BFU,
2005). Furthermore, they edit special investigation reports
on certain severe accidents as well as recommendations for
safety improvements which are derived as conclusion from
the findings of the investigations. On the scientific side, re-
searchers from various engineering disciplines are investi-
gating the topic, which has resulted, e.g., in the studies of
Ladkin (2002), Junge (2003) and Johnson (2006). Besides
delivering statistical information like relative frequencies of
specific locations, times or segments of flights, the studies
reveal findings on the reasons causing the accidents. Find-
ings with respect to technical reasons (cf. Ladkin, 2002) or
personal and organisational ones (cf. Junge, 2003), and even
regulatory problems (cf. Johnson, 2006), respectively, are ex-
pected to be used by the stakeholders of air traffic in order to
reduce overall air traffic risk by improving the aspects men-
tioned above.
For our purposes, i.e. a general risk assessment of Ger-
man air traffic, some conclusions can be drawn from these
sources:
– Most of the accidents happen during certain phases of
a flight: Start and early climb (17%) or final approach
and landing (51%) (cf. Boeing, 2004). They take place
at the close environment of an airport including itself
– Schmidt-Thome´ (2006) mention a distance of maxi-
mum 5 km around airports, however without further ev-
idence. Thompson et al. (2001) who work on the topic
of “groundling” fatalities give a more detailed differ-
entiation. Their study suggests a zone of 16 km radius
when considering this type of risk.
– Despite the enormous increase in air traffic, global ac-
cident rates have dropped from their peak in the 1970s:
Then more than 70 cases of hull losses per year, i.e.
aircrafts damaged beyond repair, had to be registered.
Since the mid-1990s, this rate has dropped to well be-
low 50 hull loss events each year. According to that
29Websites: Aviation Safety Network – http://aviation-safety.
net/index.shtml; PlaneCrashInfo.com – http://www.planecrashinfo.
com/database.htm; AirDisaster.com – http://www.airdisaster.com/
cgi bin/database.cgi [all 21/12/2005].
30Website: http://www.boeing.com/news/techissues/
[21/07/2006].
development, there is a trend of decline in the number
of fatalities (cf. Ranter, 2004).
– A similar tendency in decrease holds true for the case
of Germany, where the number of accidents has dimin-
ished continuously from 519 in 1992 to 271 in 2004
(cf. BFU, 2005:5).
Another factor relevant to the assessment and mapping of
the air traffic hazard is the distinction between scenarios of
airplanes colliding versus sheer crashes of single airplanes.
Whereas the former kind of accident affects a large area by
scattering smaller parts of the wrecks, single plane accidents
lead to a localized but strong impact. Additionally, the degree
of the hazard with respect to subsequent fires is connected to
the remaining amount of fuel in the tanks and thus to the
timing of an accident during the flight.
4.2.2 Data and methods for assessing and mapping the air
traffic risk in Germany
Based on the above considerations we decided to model and
map the air traffic hazard in the following way: The casu-
alties in Germany since 1990 due to air traffic as published
by BFU (2005) are added up resulting in an average num-
ber of 178.9 casualties per year. Linked to spatial informa-
tion an area-related risk of dying or getting injured due to
air traffic in Germany can be calculated. It is defined as
the probability that an average unprotected person present
at a certain location is killed or hurt in an accident result-
ing from air traffic. The personal risk, therefore, depends on
the place (cf. Jonkman et al., 2003:3) or the area where peo-
ple are living. According to Thompson et al. (2001), 63%
of the fatalities have to be expected within 16 km around an
airport. As there is no data given by this study with respect
to casualties, we furthermore assume that the shares of fa-
talities in- and outside the zone of 16 km can be equated to
the respective share of casualties. The number of casualties
is needed to make the information meaningfully comparable
to German statistics: The values of fatalities listed by BFU
(2005) are not able to reflect the dimension of the hazard
very well because of the short period of time in compari-
son to the variation of fatalities in different years. Taking
into account above considerations, two generic zones can be
distinguished: Areas close to the 24 German airports han-
dling IFR traffic (generic zone I: buffers of radius of 16 km)
and areas outside the 16-km-radiuses (zone II). Each buffer
covers approximately 804 km2. This leaves an area of about
339 000 km2 for generic zone II since the total area of Ger-
many is approximately 357 000 km2.
Regarding the hazard outside the airport buffers, we as-
sume that there is the same hazard across all of that area cal-
culated as the number of expected annual casualties outside
the buffers (according to above considerations, 37% of all ca-
sualties are expected there) divided by the total area of zone
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Fig. 7. Air traffic risk (casualties) in the Western part of Germany.
II. For modelling the hazard within the buffer zones, we as-
sume that there is a linear relationship31 between the proba-
bility of accidents and the amount of traffic. The latter serves
as the only determinant for the hazard under investigation:
By means of data on IFR flights provided by Arbeitsgemein-
schaft Deutscher Verkehrsflughafen (ADV, German Airports
Association), we calculate the traffic quota for each airport:
The annual number of flights taking place at a certain air-
port is divided by the annual number of flights of all Ger-
man airports. In the only case of overlapping buffers (the
three airports of Berlin) the numbers of the referring airports
are summed up before calculating a conjoint traffic quota.
German airports (indexed i in the following formulae) show
traffic quotas ti varying from 0.49% for Lu¨beck airport up
to 22.9% for the most important German airport at Frankfurt
am Main.
The area-specific annualized risk R(i) per km2 within
each airport buffer zone i is then calculated as the number
of casualties c to be expected per year within all German air-
port buffer zones divided by the total size of all buffer zone
areas a multiplied with the traffic quota:
Risk R(i)=c/a ∗ ti (4)
31This assumption is preliminary and has yet to be substantiated
by means of appropriate data.
4.2.3 Results and mapping of the air traffic risk
The spatial distribution of German airports reveals that they
are allotted all over the country (cf. Fig. 7) with the excep-
tion of North-eastern Germany where only few airports are
located. A concentration above average exists in the densely-
populated Rhine-Ruhr-area. Therefore, the latter seems to be
especially endangered by air traffic. Figure 7 shows the map
resulting from the modelling above for the area of the federal
state of North Rhine-Westphalia and its surroundings in the
Western part of Germany (note that, differing from the text,
for displaying purposes, values are given in 1 per 1000 in the
map).
Regarding the risk values calculated it has to be concluded
that the overall risk of casualties stemming from air traffic
is low. Compared to the total mortality of 2.42 people in
Germany per year and km2 (mortality rate of 0.011 in 2005),
the expected annual number of people dying and getting in-
jured due to air traffic is only 2.0E-04 per year when living
in generic zone II. This index value, however, can be consid-
erably higher in zone I, especially in close vicinity to very
important airports: It amounts to 0.032 for Frankfurt, 0.025
for Munich and 0.014 for Berlin (regarding all its airports).
Furthermore, even for small airports the values are signif-
icantly higher than for the areas outside the buffer zones,
with Lu¨beck as the smallest airport considered holding one
of 6.9E-04.
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4.2.4 Discussion of the air traffic risk analysis approach
Again, the chosen methodology for assessment and mapping
of air traffic risk has to be subject to discussion. Overall, the
indicator of the risk modelled as expected casualties per year
and km2 is one that could be easily compared to indicators
describing other perils (natural and man-made hazards). The
approach for its calculation is, for the hazard part, of statisti-
cal nature and does not include any extensive differentiation
regarding specific reasons for plane accidents. There is also a
lack of data for a detailed modelling of certain accident types
like collisions or individual plane crashes.
Regarding hazard and risk, it has to be stated that there is
no reliable data for Germany justifying a distinction between
those concepts: Vulnerability of people towards air traffic ac-
cidents might include quantifiable differences – people who
choose to travel with airlines of unequal safety standards,
people who live in high rise buildings that might collapse
yielding in more casualties per building than average etc. But
these assumptions cannot be statistically proven as for now.
Furthermore, the detailed reasons causing casualties are not
given in any of the accident databases. In German statistics
there is not even a distinction between “groundling” casual-
ties and those from people inside the aircrafts. From Ameri-
can experiences, though, “groundling” fatalities are only few
percent of all people killed by air traffic accidents (Thompson
et al., 2001). That is why we do not model “individual risk”
in addition to the area-related risk as defined above. The def-
inition of such an indicator would have many uncertainties:
Missing statistical data as well as problems of combining the
number of people inside airplanes with their high exposition
and vulnerability to crashes to the number of people on the
ground of whom only a small share is hit by plane crashes.
There are nearly no numbers let alone any distinctions be-
tween different kinds of property damages. We, therefore,
cannot include other elements of exposure apart from human
beings into our considerations. In order to expand future re-
search to this interesting direction, there is a crucial need for
better data.
4.3 Terrorism and its changing nature
So far, no consensus has been reached regarding a globally
accepted definition of terrorism (OECD, 2003:103). This is
partly due to the broad spectrum of actions subsumed under
this term in the past, but also to varied perspectives adopted
by authorities in different parts of the world. The changing
nature of the phenomenon is creating additional problems for
the development of concerted counter-strategies.
Terrorist acts can be characterized by their goals, the
strategic behaviour demonstrated, the kind of perpetrators,
their targets, the way attacks are executed, and the means or
weapons used. Whereas the aim of conventional terrorism is
to change the politics of governments by dividing them from
their citizens through the use of fear (Hoffmann, 1999; Wald-
mann, 1998), the motivations seem to have shifted during the
recent years. Some terrorist organisations are now attacking
Western values and institutions which transpose the threat
from the local to the international arena (OECD, 2003:104;
Laqueur, 2003).
The corresponding targets and means are non-
conventional, too: Apart from seeking to draw attention to
their cause, a maximum social disruption is intended, e.g.,
by attacking critical infrastructure (Apostolakis and Lemon,
2005:361). Another goal, especially of religious-based
terrorist groups, consists in causing a number of victims and
collateral damage (Bremer, 2002; OECD, 2005:10; Stern,
2003). Weapons used may be conventional, or extended to
new technologies like the internet for inflicting physical and
economic damage (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001; Sandler
and Enders, 2004), for instance via cyber attacks (Nelson
et al., 1999). Other scenarios regarded as plausible include
the use of deadly chemicals, biological agents, or the
dispersal of radioactive and nuclear materials (Kunreuther
and Michel-Kerjan, 2005:112).32
These deliberate actions are hard to predict, especially
since historical data is mostly based on conventional terror-
ism, which draws from different behavioural patterns (En-
ders and Sandler, 2000). Moreover, terrorists adapt their
strategy according to their knowledge of prevention mea-
sures taken by potential targets, the government and public
servants (Bremer, 2002). This means that the nature of the
risk is continuously evolving.33 Thus, hazard and vulnera-
bility form a unity in the case of deliberate actions in terms
of terrorism. By the aims of the assaulters, location and tim-
ing of a terrorist disaster are intrinsically tied to the attacked
vulnerable values, people and assets: The more vulnerable a
targeted system, the more attractive it becomes to malicious
attacks of all sorts; the larger the loss expected from certain
actions, the more likely the scenario would be chosen (Woo,
2002). In the following, exemplary assessments of terrorism
risk regarding conventional and non-conventional targets and
means are shown.
4.3.1 Data on international terrorism
As for any risk mentioned in this paper, an ex post approach
of analysing past events also marks the starting-point of the
investigation of conventional terrorism. However, it seems
difficult to choose suitable reference scenarios of situations
that have the potential to induce catastrophic outcomes: In
Germany, there have not been many terrorist events in the
32The borderline between war and terrorism is blurry; for an ex-
tensive discussion see, e.g., Laqueur (2003).
33Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2005) and Michel-Kerjan
(2003) who both published numerous articles on terrorism risk call
this “dynamic uncertainty”; they also refer to other characteristics
of this kind of hazard such as the interdependent security within in-
terrelated systems – it is the weakest link that determines the safety
of all members (Kunreuther and Heal, 2003).
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last two decades, so the available basis of data is scarce.
Furthermore, past attacks did not show a catastrophic scale.
However, the face of terrorism has obviously changed and
turned into a global phenomenon with varied characteristics.
Therefore, one has to look at events at foreign locations for
reference.
Due to the vast amount of terrorist acts happening world-
wide, it seems to be very challenging to create an exhaustive,
consistent and error-free database on this topic. Indeed, even
well known international sources like International Policy In-
stitute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT)34 and National Memo-
rial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT)35 reveal
some weaknesses regarding those criteria.
– The ICT database contains about 1400 selected interna-
tional terrorist attacks from all over the world that hap-
pened since the late 1980’s.
– More than just a database, the MIPT Terrorism Knowl-
edge Portal offers information on both terrorist groups
(their ideology, history, important members and pic-
tures) and attacks from around the globe dating back to
1968 for international terrorism and to 1997 regarding
domestic terrorism (i.e. in the USA).
– Detailed information on aspects shaping the vulnerabil-
ity of countries all over the world can also be found in
the report on Patterns of Global Terrorism, published by
the United States Department of State until 2004 (http:
//www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/c14818.htm [21/12/2005]).
– Another important source of current information on
the topic of terrorism, including a typology of terrorist
groups, is compiled by the library of the United States
Air Force Air University, which is available online
at http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/bibs/terror05.htm\#inter
[21/12/2005].
4.3.2 Hazard, exposure and vulnerability analysis approach
According to our examinations based on the data banks men-
tioned above and other sources (cf. Sect. 4.3.1), the attacks
of global terrorism feature common dominant aims to vary-
ing degrees: Killing people, attacking the symbolic values of
their enemies and – to a lesser extent – producing economic
losses.
Classic targets frequently attacked by shootings or bomb-
ings both in Germany and other parts of the world have been
military or diplomatic institutions like embassies and their
personnel. In contrast, unconventional terrorism has often
aimed at various soft targets that are hard to protect. In do-
ing so, terrorists sometimes try to provoke disastrous out-
34ICT Database for International Terrorist Attacks: http://www.
ict.org.il/inter ter/attacksearch.cfm [21/12/2005].
35MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base: http://www.tkb.org/Home.
jsp [21/12/2005].
perpetrators affected values
inducing
initial effects
on
type goals
process
symbolic
economic
actions
objects people
functions
secondary effects
Fig. 8. Modelling vulnerabilities of complex systems.
comes (e.g., 11 September 2001) or mass panics and hys-
teria by comparably simple means, using humble weapons
or sheer threatening. These findings have to be transferred
to the context of Germany, its population density, its sym-
bols and economic values, keeping in mind the assumptions
regarding the power36 of terrorists located there as well as
counter-terrorism measures.37
The intentional character of this peril requires delibera-
tions taking into account objectives of assaulters for possible
future attacks. With the assistance of scenario building ex-
perts from engineering and management consulting, we de-
veloped an approach to model vulnerabilities of complex sys-
tems with respect to malicious actions. This model consists
of four interdependent tasks (cf. Fig. 8):
1. setting up a typology of people or groups as possible
offenders, and their respective goals; here, we differen-
tiate between offenders with ideological, ethnical, vigi-
lant and religious motivations;
2. generating an inventory of potentially exposed elements
(objects, people), and their respective functions;
3. assessing the structural vulnerability of these elements
to certain goal-related actions of the perpetrators who
intend to produce specific effects;
4. estimating the values affected: This can be done in rela-
tion to critical processes (e.g., interruption of life-lines
or certain events), or by accounting for symbolic and
economic values.
36Decisive factors whether terrorists pose an acute threat to so-
ciety are the available means of their endowment concerning af-
filiated people, money, know-how and logistics (Kunreuther et al.,
2003:18). Catastrophe modelling experts from consultancies like
Guy Carpenter or Risk Management Solutions (RMS) elaborate on
this in theoretically oriented publications (Major, 2002) or with a
focus on terrorism risk in the United States (RMS, 2003).
37 For a compilation of institutions involved in counter-terrorism
measures in Germany confer Werner and Lechtenbo¨rger (2004).
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Table 4. Index parameters and weighting factors to calculate vulnerability index values (va) for each diplomatic mission in Germany.
Parameters Index Weight
1 Population number (million) over 100 = 1
50 to 100 = 0.5
less than 50 = 0
2
2 Membership in G8 yes = 1, no = 0 2
3 Involvement in the war against Iraq yes = 1, no = 0 2
4 Membership in NATO yes = 1, no = 0 1.5
5 Membership in OECD yes = 1, no = 0 0.5
6 Religious conflict number of entries in the
World conflict list1
(1996–2002):
4 or more = 1
less = 0
3
7 Historical information on past attacks on
diplomatic institutions
number of attempts:
4 or more = 1,
1 to 3 = 0.5
and 0 = 0
2
number of wounded/dead:
10 or more = 1
less = 0
1
8 Economic strength – GDP (billion US$) over 1000 = 1
250 to 1000 = 0.33
less than 250 = 0
1.5
1 Available at: http://www.ndcf.org/Conflict List/World2002/2002Conflictlist.htm [21/12/2005].
Task 3 and 4 co-determine the relative attraction of the en-
dangered system to different kinds of offenders. This leads
to the following research questions: How easily can the tar-
geted systems be attacked in order to produce specific effects
(structural vulnerability vs)? How attractive are the values
they represent to certain perpetrators (attraction va)?
Assessing the structural vulnerability vs can be a situation-
specific task involving extended needs for detailed data that
rarely is available to scientists. The structural vulnerability
of embassies, e.g., is best addressed by a team of engineer-
ing experts from various disciplines. Its analysis, therefore,
has to be omitted here. In contrast, we are definitely able
to judge the structural vulnerability of sites that share typi-
cal characteristics derived from one principal function, like
football stadiums. This is achieved by using an approach of
exposure analysis that can be generalized and adapted for as-
sessments of other sites that share common functions and,
therefore, characteristics. This also applies to analyses of the
relative attraction of potentially targeted systems (va). The
following section contains an outline of our approach within
the given framework.
4.3.3 Assessing the vulnerability of embassies in Germany
in terms of attraction
Attacks on embassies are representative for the conventional
type of terrorism: Malicious actors focus their attention on
these institutions because they stand for a country the terror-
ists are feeling hostile to. The reasons for this antagonism
may be manifold – the challenge is to find proxy parame-
ters that reflect this aspect of vulnerability. By using differ-
ent parameters derived from extended inductive research, a
vulnerability index va can be built which takes into account
permanent political characteristics as well as current critical
international situations.
Therefore, the population of a country is incorporated in
the index as well as its status of membership at G8, NATO
or OECD. Another criterion is currently the attendance of
the coalition of countries involved in the war against Iraq.
Regional conflicts within the territory of a country play an-
other important role in producing terrorist movements and
are, therefore, recorded and used for modelling. Economical
strength and poverty of the population are further parameters.
Moreover, historical information on past attacks on diplo-
matic institutions of a country and the respective outcomes
is collected and incorporated into the model as well.
Obviously, the results of an analysis of terrorist risk can
be very short lasting, depending on the change of a political
situation. Thus, the method used has to allow for quick adap-
tation. Additionally, some of the criteria mentioned above
seem to induce a focus on certain kinds of terrorism (re-
ligious or ideological) at the expense of other forms (e.g.,
due to ethnic conflicts). We, therefore, assign a case-specific
Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 6, 779–802, 2006 www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/6/779/2006/
D. Borst et al.: A methodology to assess man-made risks in Germany 797
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
U
K
U
S
A
Ja
p
a
n
T
u
rk
e
y
F
ra
n
c
e
It
a
ly
R
u
s
s
ia
S
p
a
in
C
h
in
a
Is
ra
e
l
M
e
x
ic
o
S
o
u
th
K
o
re
a
B
ra
z
il
In
d
ia
A
fg
h
a
n
is
ta
n
B
a
n
g
la
d
e
s
h
E
l
S
a
lv
a
d
o
r
G
e
o
rg
ia
In
d
o
n
e
s
ia
Ir
a
n
N
ig
e
ri
a
P
a
k
is
ta
n
U
s
b
e
k
is
ta
n
C
a
n
a
d
a
N
e
th
e
rl
a
n
d
s
E
g
y
p
t
D
a
n
m
a
rk
Is
la
n
d
C
o
n
g
o
N
o
rw
a
y
P
o
la
n
d
P
o
rt
u
g
a
l
S
lo
v
a
k
ia
C
z
e
c
h
H
u
n
g
a
ry
B
u
lg
a
ri
a
E
s
to
n
ia
L
a
tv
ia
L
it
h
u
a
n
ia
R
o
m
a
n
ia
S
lo
v
e
n
ia
A
u
s
tr
a
li
a
Ir
a
q
L
ib
y
a
N
o
rt
h
K
o
re
a
P
h
il
ip
p
in
e
s
S
a
u
d
i-
A
ra
b
ia
S
u
d
a
n
S
y
ri
a
T
h
a
il
a
n
d
Z
im
b
a
b
w
e
P
e
ru
U
g
a
n
d
a
A
n
g
o
la
E
ri
tr
e
a
P
a
n
a
m
a
E
c
u
a
d
o
r
T
a
ji
k
is
ta
n
N
e
p
a
l
B
u
ru
n
d
i
P
h
il
ip
p
in
e
H
a
it
i
S
o
u
th
A
fr
ic
a
Y
e
m
e
n
C
o
lu
m
b
ia
K
e
n
y
a
E
th
io
p
e
a
C
a
m
b
o
d
ia
L
e
b
a
n
o
n
A
lg
e
ri
a
Fig. 9. Index values (va) reflecting the attraction of national embassies to terrorism.
weight to each criterion before calculating the vulnerability
index; these weight and index parameters are listed in Ta-
ble 4.
Figure 9 shows this index in a generalized form. Its sta-
bility is tested with each additional terrorist event occurring.
Under current conditions, index values of 0.8138 have been
calculated for the United Kingdom and the USA; their em-
bassies, therefore, are regarded as the most endangered ones
in Germany.
This attraction consists in its symbolic value to the ag-
gressors, which we measure via political and socio-economic
data. It forms the basis of further considerations such as inte-
grating geospatial aspects like the location of the embassies
within their host city or country. Other necessary additions
for achieving a complete risk assessment are considerations
regarding the kind of attack and protective measures taken by
the exposed elements and entities responsible for their secu-
rity, which, as mentioned, is beyond the scope of this study.
4.3.4 Exposure and vulnerability assessment of football
games in stadiums
Specific characteristics regarding vulnerability
A terrorist attack at a football game, for instance at the
FIFA World Cup 2006 in Germany, is an example for
non-conventional terrorism. Many factors contribute to
the vulnerability of such an event, in terms of structural
38The index value of each country is scaled down from 0 to 1
where 1 is the maximum value. This is done by dividing the vulner-
ability index of a country with the sum of all weights.
conditions as well as regarding its attractiveness to potential
perpetrators:
– Football is by far the most popular sport in Germany,
attracting approximately 400 000 spectators every week
to the stadiums where the nine games of the 1. Bun-
desliga (Premier League) take place, and many more
people are following the media coverage thereof. Dur-
ing the World Cup, worldwide attention could be taken
for granted, playing to the aims of terrorists who often
consider their acts a means of communicating their ide-
ology (cf. Waldmann, 1998).
– Mass rallies by themselves state a considerable hazard
to spectators,39 especially in the case of stadiums that
are sold-out. Infamous aggressive fans of certain teams
can play an important role for the hazard within a sta-
dium during the game or outside of the stadium before
and after the game, intimidating other spectators and
thus setting up a climate where panics might happen.
– As another factor, the Stiftung Warentest (2006), an in-
dependent German foundation testing goods and ser-
39In 1985, 39 spectators died and more then 400 were injured
when English and Italian hooligans started to fight each other during
a final game in the Heysel Stadium in Brussels. People were killed
by others panicking and victims were pressed against the wall until
it collapsed. By means of records from 1946 through 2005, it has
to be concluded that events of mass panicking and hooliganism lead
to substantial casualties in Europe with 670 dead people. Deserving
of great thanks, the collection of data was placed to our disposal by
the editorial department of German football magazine “kicker”.
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vices by means of scientific methods, in a recent
study denounced deficiencies within German stadiums.
These refer to problems of structural safety (vs). The
deficiencies, ranging from minor to considerable for the
twelve stadiums selected for hosting the FIFA World
Cup 2006, stem from problems of stadium objects us-
able as weapons, fire safety, escape route problems (es-
cape bottlenecks and orientation), risk of tripping, and
congestion pressure (i.e. are there sufficient emergency
exits with respect to sell-out spectator capacity?).
Fully booked stadiums have to be expected for international
events like the World Cup, and this facilitates the triggering
of panics by assaulters. The sites and times of the games
are pre-scheduled, with the preliminary round opponents of
each game even known half a year in advance thus allow-
ing a strategic planning of attacks. Additionally, economic
stakes in football are stunning (cf. Strehl, 2005) and can en-
tail enormous follow-up losses in case of an attack. These
losses might be a goal in itself,40 at least of terrorists pursu-
ing political and religious motives like Al Quaida.
Research on the vulnerability of stadiums due to terrorist
attacks has not been conducted so far, and thus it is not
possible to compare our studies with others as it was done for
NPP and air traffic. However, in assessing the vulnerability
of stadiums used during the FIFA World Cup 2006, we
follow state of the art research methodologies that include
comprehensive analyses of the exposed elements, careful
constructions of scenarios and their rankings.
Data collection for the vulnerability assessment of football
games in stadiums
The research team has, although hindered through nondis-
closure of information by both official and private contacts,
systematically collected and processed information on
the stadiums including their size, building characteristics
like emergency installations and exits as well as safety
plans, safety management and exercises. In workshops
with experts41, scenarios for possible attacks have been
developed and compared with each other regarding their
40Cf. the announcement of Osama Bin Laden on 30 October
2004, regarding his motivation to attack the people of the United
States of America. The breakdown of capital markets after 11
September 2001 is said to have been intended and partially con-
trolled by him and the World Islamic Front for Jihad against Cru-
saders and Jews.
41Together with Walter Schmitz and Karl Neubauer from In-
dustrieanlagen Betriebsgesellschaft mbH (IABG, Industrial Asset
Management Company), a consulting company for defence and
security, we conducted a real-time computer-assisted terror game
dealing with synchronized attacks on critical infrastructure such as
energy and information networks and a football stadium intended to
be used during the FIFA World Cup 2006. Workshop-participants
included academicians from various disciplines (natural sciences,
engineering, economics) and from public authorities. Follow-up
possible outcome of losses in terms of money, human life
and health, or system functionality.
Exposure analysis
As a first step for assessing the exposure vs , we com-
piled a list of individual objects within a typical stadium
during a football match. The values of these potential objects
at risk were appraised by differentiating between asset value,
functional value for the continuation of the game as well as
for the whole World Cup, and symbolic societal value.
The highest asset value was assigned to the stands and
roof; these constructions also carry the highest functional
value. The workshop participants also stated high func-
tional values for lighting installation, the grass of the field,
and camera plus TV-broadcasting installations. Highest
symbolic values were assigned to the stands and roof,
furthermore to the Very Important Persons (VIP) and the
VIP area, players and referees as well as normal spectators
(non-VIP). Additionally, all objects besides toilets, grass of
the field, football equipment, camera plus TV-broadcasting
installations, and security equipment were assigned a panic
factor, which means that the destruction of these objects by
a severe attack might have the potential to trigger a panic.
Vulnerability analysis
As a next step, the relative vulnerability va of objects
and people to attacks occurring before and after as well as
during a match was checked. Catering services (before a
match), doors and gates (before, during and after a game)
as well as camera plus TV-broadcasting installations were
assigned the highest vulnerability values. The same applies
to regular spectators (not VIP), during and after a match.
Scenario modelling and ranking
After these preparatory steps, our scenario building
framework (described in Sect. 4.3.2) was applied to this
context: Depending on each type of perpetrators, a sequence
of scenarios for attacks during the FIFA World Cup 2006
was established and arranged according to their relative
probability.
Following the typology of Benzin (2005), only few types
of assaulters can be expected to attack the series of matches:
Those with religious motives or those with an ethnic or na-
tionalistic motivation provided that their teams are listed.
During the workshops, varied scenarios of attacks including
sheer threat of committing a terrorist act were acted out, and
workshops concentrated on football games in stadiums and their
potential endangerment through terrorist acts. We started with on-
site inspections of a typical stadium during games, led by insurance
specialists, and continued with research group meetings attended by
football experts.
Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 6, 779–802, 2006 www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/6/779/2006/
D. Borst et al.: A methodology to assess man-made risks in Germany 799
the susceptibility of typical stadium objects and people to
distinct forms of attack was investigated.
In this step of the analysis, we also introduced success
factors spanning five levels42 of potential success on the part
of the assaulters. Thereby we distinguished between direct
(immediate) damages to objects or people and indirect dam-
ages caused by effects following the event like the outbreak
of a panic. The probable overall success of terrorists trying
to destroy asset, functional and symbolic values was then
determined for each form of attack (multiplication of success
factors with the index values of the different categories and
adding up the results for all targets), so that a ranking of
different scenarios could be performed.
Results of the exposure and vulnerability analysis
Resulting from the scenario ranking, the biggest expected
success and, therefore, a high probability of realisation by
terrorists acting rationally43 was attached to the poisoning of
beverages. The scenario modelling included further details
such as the attack mode, its timing as well as motivation
and kind of aggressions. It was concluded that attacks
on the central catering station before the start of a match
during the first round of events like the FIFA World Cup
2006 by religiously motivated terrorists (Al Quaida) can
trigger panics to the audience which might lead to enormous
consequences including a high number of casualties, the
stop of the match as well as a temporary discontinuation
of the games. Additionally, catering for all remaining
matches could be suspended, and the games might need
to be relocated to another country inducing considerable
economic losses for the original host country.
Discussion of the risk assessment
This risk assessment done for typical football events in
typical football stadiums can, of course, be extended and
adapted to the individual characteristics of games and
stadiums (regarding the match schedules, the structural
layout of particular stadiums, their capacity, etc.) while
taking into account the risk management measures provided
at these sites.
The method suggested for analyzing terrorist threats in-
volves assessments that are more subjective than the ap-
proaches used for accidental risks. However, when elabo-
rated by a group of experts exchanging their views, certain
objectivity can be expected through the consensus reached.
Since information on possible attacks and offenders is in-
trinsically scarce, dynamic uncertainty (Kunreuther et al.,
2003) will persist and necessitate analytical approaches that
are flexible enough to adapt to increasing knowledge about
42Very high, high, middle, low, and very low.
43Neglecting particular countermeasures to be employed by se-
curity organisations like the police.
the threat or to changing motivations, strategies and means
of potential aggressors.
5 Summary, conclusion and outlook
Various approaches for assessing and mapping man-made
risks in Germany are presented in this paper. We focused on
disastrous accidents that have the potential to affect extended
geographic areas, and presented models for assessing terror-
ism as a major hazard originating from deliberate malicious
actions.
Following catastrophe modelling, hazard, exposure and
vulnerability are explored dependent on the kind of risk un-
der review. The damages considered are restricted, so far, to
life and health of potentially affected people. Frequencies for
accidental hazards are estimated based on values published
by supervisory authorities and statistical observations of our
own, including absolute probabilities. For terrorism, the rel-
ative probability of events is either judged via rankings of the
likelihood of attacks dependent on the attraction of potential
targets, or it is derived from considerations regarding hazard
characteristics, structural vulnerability and possible scenar-
ios.
NPP constitute a complex man-made hazard of interna-
tional dimensions. For its analysis, expert knowledge is used
and supplemented with observations on aging effects. The
assessment has to rely on the only case of a major accident
registered so far: Chernobyl, 1986. Therefore, only coarse
estimates regarding the vulnerability of the population living
nearby are possible. Risk is modelled considering the popu-
lation density within the area that is certain to be hit severely.
The air traffic hazard is predominantly located at close dis-
tance to airports, and statistics seem to back up a decline in
recent years on German territory. Due to the lack of other
data that might justify a different course of action, we do not
further distinguish between exposure and vulnerability with
respect to this hazard. Risk is modelled as an area-related
phenomenon and measured by the expected value of getting
injured or dying within one of the zones around airports or
outside of them. Since there are only few incidents with re-
spect to this hazard in Germany, the amount of data is very
limited and the numbers available show a great variation over
time. Therefore, the statistic-based approach of modelling is
rather limited.
Terrorism risk is assessed for conventional and non-
conventional threats. Attacks of embassies, though not a re-
cent problem, still constitute a complex hazard of interna-
tional dimensions. Our modelling is based on assumptions
regarding the attraction displayed by embassies as exposed
elements. Football events are exemplary for mass rallies and
the site- and time-specific threats potentially directed towards
them. The approach chosen to analyse this non-conventional
risk is extensive: Multiple elements of one object-type are
assessed regarding their susceptibility to different kinds of
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attacks within predefined scenarios, and the subsequent like-
lihood of success (from the viewpoint of terrorists) is judged.
This allows a ranking of attack modes and can easily be
adapted to specific events or sites and to local risk manage-
ment practices as well.
Our assessments must be developed, of course:
– Regarding the risk of NPP different distance-related
health hazard categories should be integrated in the
model – if such information is available from experts
in public health. In addition, even though human ca-
sualties are of overriding concern regarding accidents
in NPP, values of property lost could be included and
mapped in order to get a more complete picture of this
man-made risk.
– The latter point is also a reasonable extension for im-
proving the assessment of air traffic risk in the buffer
zones around airports. Property lost in this case includes
air cargo. An improved mapping might be achieved by
differentiating between the loss of life, health and prop-
erty stemming from the aircrafts plus their contents on
the one hand, and humans as well as property affected
at the ground, on the other hand.
– The assessment approach used for conventional terror-
ism could be transferred to other objects like specific
government or commercial buildings, sites of cultural
importance (museums, monuments), etc. – the mapping
of “hot spots” in Berlin which can be seen as an ag-
glomeration of buildings attractive to various kinds of
assaulters is an upcoming project of the research team.
In this case, geographic and other interdependencies be-
tween attractive targets have to be included as well.
– However, to achieve a realistic mapping of risks, data
is needed about risk management practices. For safety
and security reasons, this kind of data is hardly available
which impedes a further development of the vulnerabil-
ity index.
Other data gaps have to be filled, too: For hazards result-
ing in predominantly local damages general aggregate data
has to be completed with regional stocks of exposure. This
includes detailed information on asset values, especially in-
dustrial and commercial ones, and their geographical distri-
bution. The same holds true for site- and time-specific es-
timations of people at risk or losses due to interruptions of
daily life, particularly business processes, what could be an
aim of malevolent assaulters in itself.
With an improved knowledge on the geographical distri-
bution of elements at risk and their characteristics, detailed
calculations of potential direct and indirect losses could be
carried out.
Our risk-specific analyses might serve as a starting point
for integrated risk research and a synoptic mapping with
other hazards. This kind of assessment is, e.g., already em-
ployed by GRS (2002) regarding the risk of an airplane being
directed into a German NPP.44
What is needed in addition, are investigations regarding
the international comparability and compatibility of statis-
tics, scenarios used, and risk assessments as this affords
a valuable foundation for identifying elements at risk and
risk management planning – at the national and international
level.
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